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INTRODUCTION
Title VII and its ministerial exception remain in tension in at-will
employment contracts, particularly in school settings. Though courts
have uniformly concluded that “the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment require a narrowing construction of
Title VII in order to insulate the relationship between a religious orga-
nization and its ministers from constitutionally impermissible interfer-
ence by the government,”1 no jurisprudence has been established that
creates a uniform test for who qualifies as a ministerial employee and
when the exception should apply.
In 2012, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to answer the
aforementioned questions in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC.2 However, rather than setting a precedent
for the ministerial exception’s parameters, the Court chose only to
comment on the facts in the case at bar, holding that the exception
covered the plaintiff, an employee fired for threatening to sue the
church where she was employed.3 Acknowledging that the school’s
1. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43240, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss).
2. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. V. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694,
705 (2012).
3. Id. at 701, 710.
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decision to fire an employee for threatening to sue the church should
be afforded protection under the ministerial exception, the Court
based its analysis on that fact that the affected employee’s role and
responsibilities required her to convey the Church’s message and
carry out its mission.4 Further, the Court clarified that the ministe-
rial exception is a fact-based affirmative defense,5 not a “jurisdic-
tional bar.” 6 This is because “the issue presented by the exception is
‘whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’
not whether the court has ‘power to hear [the] case.’ ” 7
Courts across the United States would have benefitted from more
specific judicial precedence in Hosanna-Tabor. One case in particu-
lar, Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, underscored the uncertainty of
a religious organization’s freedom to terminate members of its minis-
try based on failure to adhere to religious doctrine.8 Like Hosanna-
Tabor, Dias originated out of the Sixth Circuit; there, two private
Catholic schools in Cincinnati, Ohio discharged a middle school
teacher for breach of contract after she became pregnant out of wed-
lock via artificial insemination.9 Operating under the assumption
that they would be covered by the ministerial exception to Title VII,
the school believed they were not exceeding any civil rights limita-
tions by discharging Dias for violating her contract.10 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio disagreed,
denying the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and holding
for Dias under the theory that she was not a ministerial employee and
therefore the schools did not have a legitimate, non-discriminatory
purpose for terminating her.11
4. Id. at 710.
5. Id. at 709 n.4.
6. Pretrial Brief for Defendants at 2, Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV
-00251 (S.D. Ohio 2013)(citing Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 at 709, n.4).
7. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)).
8. See Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12417 at *9–*10 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 1, 2013) (granting Summary Judgment for Defendants in
part, denying Summary Judgment for Defendants in part, and denying Summary Judg-
ment for Plaintiff in part).
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id. at *2–*3. Defendants argued that Dias’s contract contained a “morals clause”
that, if enforceable, would “per se constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the
termination of Plaintiff’s employment, and thus preclude any Title VII or analogous state
law-based discrimination claim. An enforceable ‘morals clause’ would also mean that
Plaintiff—an unmarried woman who conceived a child through artificial insemination
while engaged in a homosexual relationship—per se violated the Catholic teachings in-
corporated into the morals clause, and thus cannot assert a claim for breach of contract.”
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Oral Argument at 1, Dias v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 1, 2013).
11. Dias, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12417, at *18–*19.
2015] DIAS V. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI 475
This Note investigates the pressing need—particularly in employ-
ment at-will contexts in religious schools—for the judicial system to
articulate a test for determining who qualifies as a “ministerial em-
ployee.” A clearer definition is needed in order to preserve religious
freedom while balancing fundamental civil rights. Failure to articulate
more definite parameters for the ministerial exception could soon
have significant impacts—from the end of the ministerial exception
entirely, arguably precipitating a sharp decline in religious freedom,
to a possible necessity for religious organizations and employees to
adhere to stringent, detailed employment agreements that may border
on unconscionable.
In Part I, Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati is outlined as a case
study on the ministerial exception, investigating Dias’s employment
agreement and subsequent discharge. Though the fact pattern in
Dias is particularly unique—and may not soon be replicated in future
proceedings—the case highlights the need for a clearer definition of
the “ministerial exception” in an ever-evolving modern employment
context. Following Dias through its stages of litigation, beginning with
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and concluding with a jury holding
in favor of Dias in Ohio, Part I traces the key issues that the Court
identified as determinative in the case.12
Moving from specific to general, Part II next considers the state
of the “ministerial exception,” tracing its judicially created roots from
inception through Hosanna-Tabor. It evaluates in Part III how a min-
ister should be defined in light of the deference the Supreme Court
gave religious organizations in Hosanna-Tabor. Lastly, Part IV out-
lines a potential standard for applying the ministerial exception to
Title VII suits and other employment discrimination disputes.
I. DIAS V. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI
Christa Dias began employment with Holy Family School and St.
Lawrence School, two private, Catholic schools in Cincinnati, Ohio,
in August 2008 and August 2009, respectively.13 The schools teach
12. The Southern District of Ohio identified three key issues in Dias, particularly sig-
nificant in evaluating whether the case should be decided in summary judgment. Specif-
ically, the Court identified the following issues: 1. Whether the ministerial exception
applied to Dias, in light of Hosanna-Tabor; 2. Whether Dias raised legally sufficient claims
for breach of contract and pregnancy discrimination; 3. Whether the case violates the Free
Exercise Clause, thereby barring Dias from recovery. Dias, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12417,
at *4–*5; see also Lisa Cornwell, Jury Finds for Ohio Teacher Fired While Pregnant,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 3, 2013, 8:08 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/jury-finds-ohio
-teacher-fired-while-pregnant, archived at http://perma.cc/BW3V-HHWM [hereinafter
Cornwell, Jury].
13. Dias, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240 at *2.
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a Catholic curriculum to children in the kindergarten to eighth-grade
levels.14 Holy Family School and St. Lawrence School hired Dias to fill
the role of Technology Coordinator, which entailed overseeing the
school’s computer systems and instructing students on computer
technology.15 Because she is a non-Catholic,16 Holy Family and St.
Lawrence did not permit Dias to teach religion classes; she also had
“no responsibility for religious instruction” in the schools.17 Her con-
tracts with both Holy Family and St. Lawrence did, however, contain
an explicit morals clause, which stated “[The teacher will] comply
with and act consistently in accordance with the stated philosophy
and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and the policies and
directives of the School and the Archdiocese.”18 Furthermore, her
“job description, evaluations, and employee handbook each explained
that her position included serving as a Catholic role model and pur-
veyor of the faith.”19 The contracts also included an additional morality
provision, which required that, in “keeping with the expectations of
the students as well as the parents and donors who pay their tui-
tion. . . . [A]ll certificated teachers, no matter their teaching subject,
are expected to play a part in their students’ religious instruction and
the mission of the school.”20
After Dias accepted her positions with St. Lawrence and Holy
Family, the schools offered to rehire her for the 2010–2011 school
year; accepting the positions, Dias again signed two contracts that con-
tained the same morals clause.21 Though this agreement was articu-
lated in writing, the Archdiocese later argued that violating the terms
14. See About Us, HOLY FAMILY SCHOOL, http://www.holyfamilycincinnati.org/school
/AboutUs.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/7SZ6-G7ND (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). Holy
Family’s stated goals are to “provide opportunities for the students to experience spiritual
development through liturgy; sacraments and formal religious instruction in the classroom;
to provide, as best possible, for the various levels of individual pupil ability; and to provide
proper study habits and stress basic skills at all levels of study. Due to an extremely gener-
ous corporate donation to the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, Holy Family School was able to
install state of the art computer equipment insuring the best possible computer training
for our children.” Id. St. Lawrence School states a similar mission, “to help each student
find their unique strengths, build on those strengths and obtain academic and personal
success while exploring and nurturing their relationship with God.” See About Us, ST.
LAWRENCE SCHOOL, http://www.stlschool.com/about-us, archived at http://perma.cc/ND3E
-UKY4 (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
15. Dias, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240 at *2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Defendants’ Motion, supra note 10, at 2. Dias signed a one-year employment agree-
ment with Holy Family and St. Lawrence for the 2009–2010 school year; both contracts con-
tained the morals clause provision.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 3.
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of a signed employment contract is not the only basis for terminating
employment. Even violating a known school policy can be a legitimate,
non-discriminatory basis for terminating an employee.22
At the time that Dias signed her employment agreements for the
2009–2010 school year, she had been in a monogamous, homosexual
relationship for several years.23 She and her partner had also been
planning to have children, and in 2008 decided that Dias would con-
ceive via artificial insemination.24 In fact, Dias was already pregnant
at the time she signed her 2010–2011 employment agreements with
St. Lawrence and Holy Family schools.25
On October 15th, 2010, Dias notified Jennifer O’Brien (“O’Brien”),
the principal of Holy Family School, that she was five and a half
months pregnant, and that she would require maternity leave be-
ginning February 2011.26 O’Brien stated that she did not “consider
[Dias’s] pregnancy to be a problem. . . . However, O’Brien indicated
that she would have to raise the matter with the pastor of Holy Family
Church.” 27 Then, after speaking with another colleague, O’Brien
informed Dias that she would likely be terminated “because she was
pregnant and unmarried.” 28 The following Monday, October 18th,
2010, Dias informed O’Brien that her pregnancy was the result of
artificial insemination, not premarital intercourse.29 Following dis-
cussions among school administrators, Dias was discharged on
October 21st and 22nd for “failure to comply and act consistently in
accordance with the stated philosophy and teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church.” 30 Initially, the schools cited Dias’s becoming preg-
nant outside of marriage as the reason for termination, but later
changed their reason to Dias’s use of artificial insemination (a “viola-
tion of the philosophy and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church”).31
Dias filed a complaint on April 21st, 2011 against both schools
and the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, claiming that the schools’ actions
constituted pregnancy discrimination under federal and state law,
22. Id. at 9 (citing Boyd v. Harding Acad., 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996); Chambers v.
Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 843 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987)).
23. Id. at 3 (citing Deposition of Christa Dias at 202–203 (Oct. 1, 2012)).
24. Defendant’s Motion, supra note 10, at 2 (citing Deposition of Christa Dias at 202–
203).
25. Id. (citing Deposition of Christa Dias at 248).
26. Complaint at 3, Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 21, 2011).
27. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *2–*3 (S.D.
Ohio 2012).
28. Id. at *3.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id.
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and breach of her employment contract without good cause.32 She fur-
ther alleged that the schools’ policy was not enforced equally against
men and women.33
The Archdiocese subsequently filed to dismiss, contending that
Dias was terminated for “failing to meet the Schools’ legitimate expec-
tations for employment—particularly the requirement that she served
as a Catholic role model,” that her contract—particularly the morals
clause—is enforceable as a matter of law, and that Dias failed to
establish that the morals clause was not applied in a gender-neutral
manner.34 Furthermore, the Archdiocese contended that Dias and
the Schools had a “meeting of the minds” regarding the morals clause
in her contract, specifically regarding the Church’s views on artifi-
cial insemination.35
When the case went before the Southern District of Ohio, the
Court identified three determinative issues:
First, whether the ministerial exception applies to this case in light
of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Hosanna-Tabor; second
whether Plaintiff has raised legally sufficient claims for breach
of contract and pregnancy discrimination; and third, whether this
case raises issues of entanglement between church and state
and/or violates the Free Exercise Clause, such that Plaintiff has
no recourse.36
Each issue is separately evaluated below.
A. Does the Ministerial Exception Apply?
Turning first to whether the ministerial exception should apply,
the Court looked to the precedent set by the Supreme Court in
Hosanna-Tabor. There, the Court articulated that “[f]or the ministe-
rial exception to bar an employment discrimination claim, two factors
must be present: (1) the employer must be a religious institution,
and (2) the employee must be a ministerial employee.” 37 Neither party
disputed that Holy Family and St. Lawrence schools were religious
institutions; therefore, the issue then turned on whether Dias quali-
fied as a ministerial employee. Because the Court declined to articu-
late a test in Hosanna-Tabor, the Southern District of Ohio relied
32. Id. at *4.
33. Cornwell, Jury, supra note 12.
34. Defendants’ Motion, supra note 10, at 6, 9.
35.  Id. at 12.
36. Dias, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *8 (emphasis omitted).
37. Id. at *10 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 709–710, 707).
2015] DIAS V. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI 479
instead on how closely the Hosanna fact pattern aligned with Dias’s
in making its determination.38
Dias contended that her case was completely distinct from
Hosanna—the Archdiocese “did not hold [her] out as a minister,
they did not give her any sort of religious title or commission, and
the congregations of the Defendant churches took no role in review-
ing her ‘skills in ministry’ or her ‘ministerial responsibilities.’ ” 39 She
further argued that the Archdiocese “never charged her with teach-
ing the faith, participating in religious services, or leading devotional
exercises, and she never held herself out as a minister, nor did she
ever undergo religious training.” 40
The Archdiocese contended that indeed Dias must be deemed a
ministerial employee, particularly in light of Hosanna-Tabor’s inter-
pretation that when an individual’s “job duties reflect[] a role in con-
veying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission,” 41 a
ministerial exception bars an employment discrimination claim.
Furthermore, “[r]equiring a church to . . . retain an unwanted minis-
ter . . . interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriv-
ing the church of control over the selection of those who will personify
its beliefs.” 42 Emphasizing that the Supreme Court expressly stated
that “ ‘the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious
congregation,’ ” 43 and employees who “perform non-religious duties
may also be deemed ‘ministerial,’ ” the Archdiocese urged the Court
to defer to the Church’s right to choose its ministers without the threat
of judicial second-guessing.44
In addition to their reliance on judicial precedence, Archdiocese
leadership testified at length to the school’s culture and expectations
of its employees. One Pastor at St. Lawrence stated, “[E]very person
involved in [St. Lawrence] is part of the mission of the church and the
school . . . it doesn’t mean that just because you’re not teaching a
religion class, that you’re not teaching. You teach by modeling and
example as well.” 45 Furthermore, the Schools contended that Dias’s
role as a ministerial employee was understood by her students and
38. Id. at *11–*12. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court unanimously upheld the right of reli-
gious institutions “to select and control who will minister to the faithful,” barring “claims
concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”
132 S. Ct. 694, 709, 697 (2012).
39. Dias, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240 at *14.
40. Id.
41. Defendants’ Motion, supra note 10, at 15–16 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct.
at 705–706).
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707).
44. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
45. Id. at 17 (citing Watkins Deposition at 32).
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fellow teachers, and was reflected in all of her employment-related
materials—including her contract, job description, handbook, and
evaluations.46
Not persuaded by the Archdiocese’s contentions, the court held
that Dias was not a minister for purposes of the ministerial excep-
tion, emphasizing that she was not permitted to teach Catholic doc-
trine, having “received no religious training or title and had no reli-
gious duties.” 47 “[I]t is not enough,” the court said, “to generally call
her a ‘role model,’ or find that she is a ‘minister’ by virtue of her af-
filiation with a religious school.” 48 Therefore, Dias was not barred
by the ministerial exception in pursuing her claims.49
B. Breach of Contract and Pregnancy Discrimination
Next the court turned to Dias’s breach of contract and pregnancy
discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit has consistently upheld the
validity of morals clauses.50 Yet, the morals clause in Dias’s contract
posed an interesting question for the Court—does the phrase “comply
with and act consistently in accordance with the stated philosophy
and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church” encompass the use of
artificial insemination, a practice that the Church considers to be
“gravely immoral?” 51 Regardless, Dias argued that reading a restric-
tion on artificial insemination in the clause was a reaching conclu-
sion, and furthermore that the Sixth Circuit cases upholding morals
clauses were inapplicable because they pertained to morals clauses
that were applied in a gender-neutral fashion.52 The District Court
agreed, stating that when construing the facts in Dias’s favor, her
breach of contract claim did contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” because her termination was based on the schools’ interpretation
of the morals clause.53
The morals clause in Dias’s contract also implicitly begged the
question of whether—if the phrase “upholding Catholic doctrine”
implicitly included a restriction on artificial insemination—this policy
46. Id. at 18.
47. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *17(2012).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting
moral clauses applied in a general, neutral fashion are not basis for pregnancy discrimi-
nation claims); Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996) (up-
holding morals clause that prohibited employees from engaging in premarital sex).
51. Dias, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *17–*18(2012).
52. Id. at *18–*19.
53. Id. at *20 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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applied equally to men and women. In 1978, Congress passed the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, an amendment to Title VII, specifying
that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy.54 The Sixth Circuit has on several occasions reconciled Title
VII with the ministerial exception.55 Interestingly, in a separate Sixth
Circuit case, Boyd v. Harding Academy, the court held that while vio-
lating a prohibition against employees engaging in premarital sex is
a legitimate nondiscriminatory justification for termination, becoming
pregnant by artificial insemination may not constitute a violation.56
The Boyd Court’s distinction turned on the defendant’s conclusion that
“if [plaintiff] was pregnant . . . it would establish that she had engaged
in extramarital sexual intercourse,” resulting in legitimate grounds
for termination under the morals clause of her contract.57 The court
noted, “[a]lthough hypothetically plaintiff could have become preg-
nant by means of artificial insemination, during her conversations
she gave no indication that this was so.” 58 Regardless, the Archdio-
cese, with St. Lawrence and Holy Family schools, drew the distinction
that the defendant in Boyd was a school affiliated with the Church
of Christ, whereas the Catholic Church has “unequivocally declared
the use of artificial insemination to be gravely immoral, and reviewing
courts must give deference to a church’s determination and enforce-
ment of its own doctrine.” 59
Articulating that at the summary judgment stage, the court need
only to “determine whether Plaintiff [had] alleged a plausible com-
plaint of pregnancy discrimination,” the court found that further dis-
covery was needed to determine whether the policy was applied
equally to both females and males, and whether artificial insemina-
tion should qualify as a contractual violation.60
C. Does this Case Violate the Free Exercise Clause?
The Archdiocese further contended that a secular court’s involve-
ment in resolving an issue pertaining to a “morals clause” violates the
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1991).
55. See, e.g., Cline, 206 F.3d at 667, 668 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the Defendant, stating that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the defendant “enforce[d] its policy solely by observing the pregnancy of its
female teachers, which would constitute a form of pregnancy discrimination”); Boyd, 88
F.3d at 413 (violating a prohibition against employees engaging in premarital sex is a
legitimate nondiscriminatory justification for termination).
56. Boyd, 88 F.3d at 412 n.1.
57. Id. at 412, 413.
58. Id. at 412 n.1.
59. Defendants’ Motion, supra note 10, at 7 n.2. (citing Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad.
of Wilmington, Inc, 450 F.3d 130, 141 (3rd Cir. 2006)).
60. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *23 (S.D. Ohio
2012).
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Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.61 However, the Court
blew past this argument, noting that, “religious institutions are, and
have been, subject to court review of Title VII employment discrimi-
nation claims made by non-ministerial employees all across the coun-
try.” 62 After considering both parties’ fervent arguments, the Court
ultimately concluded that Dias was not a ministerial employee, and
that “she ha[d] raised plausible claims of pregnancy discrimination
and breach of contract,” denying the Archdiocese’s motion to dismiss.63
The Archdiocese then moved for summary judgment, facing
Dias again in the Southern District in a flurry of responses and
cross-motions.64 At this stage, the court articulated the matter as
essentially an employment dispute.65 Again the court rejected the
Archdiocese’s contention that the ministerial exception should apply,
articulating that the schools “attempt[ed] to swallow up the ministe-
rial exception by characterizing teachers generally as role models
and therefore ‘ministers,’ ” and emphasizing that because Dias was
not permitted to teach Catholic doctrine, she could not “genuinely
be considered a ‘minister’ of the Catholic faith.” 66
Because the court rejected the ministerial exception’s application,
Dias retained her Title VII protection against pregnancy discrimina-
tion. Again, the Archdiocese contended that Dias could not show that
the morals clause in her contract was not the real reason for her termi-
nation, and therefore they were entitled to summary judgment in
their favor.67 Dias responded that the morals clause is “an illegal
provision because it prohibits being unwed and pregnant and being
pregnant by artificial insemination,” two conditions she claimed were
“squarely protected by Title VII.” 68
Again the District Court revisited Sixth Circuit precedence on
the enforcement of morals clauses and related school policies, focusing
on Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc. and Cline v. Catholic
Diocese.69 The District Court noted that in Boyd, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the termination of a teacher at a religious school for violating
the school’s policy against extramarital sex, holding that “so long as
such a code of conduct was applied equally to both genders, it could
61. Id. at *23–*24, *10.
62. Id. at *24.
63. Id.
64. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12417
at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id. at *9–*10.
67. Id. at *12.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *12–*13.
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be upheld as valid and non-pretextual.” 70 The district court further
noted that “though the defendant in Boyd used the phrase ‘pregnant
and unwed’ in conversations with the plaintiff, the real reason be-
hind such statement, and consistent with the school’s policy, was a
prohibition against engaging in premarital sex.” 71
Similarly, the court in Cline maintained the validity of such a
policy, holding that “a policy against premarital sex can be upheld so
long as it is enforced in a gender-neutral fashion.” 72 Applying this pre-
cedent, the Southern District of Ohio held that the morals clause in
Dias’s contract “lack[ed] specificity such that only an evaluation of
the decision-makers’ testimony can show whether their initial reason
for terminating Plaintiff was simply enforcement of a policy against
premarital sex.” 73 Further, the court held that this is a “factual deter-
mination for a jury.” 74 The court further held that a jury needed to
determine whether the morals clause in Dias’s contract was enforced
equally against male and female employees; if only enforced against
female teachers, it was a form of pregnancy discrimination.75
Additionally, the court rejected Dias’s arguments that in light
of Boyd, the Archdiocese’s terminating her for becoming pregnant via
artificial insemination was per se discrimination because there was
“no reason that a policy against artificial insemination, like a policy
against extra-marital sex, could be upheld so long as it would be
enforced in a gender-neutral manner.” 76 However, the court did recog-
nize a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy is equally
enforced against men, noting that if “the policy ha[d] been enforced
unequally as to men and women, [a jury] could find Defendants’
reason pretext for pregnancy discrimination.” 77 Likewise, the court
rejected Dias’s cross-motion for summary judgment, viewing her con-
tentions “as an expansive view of Title VII that does not comport with
Sixth Circuit precedent.” 78
The court also distinguished Dias’s Title VII claim as distinct
from her breach of contract claim.79 The court articulated that Dias
could not attempt to enforce a contract against St. Lawrence and Holy
Family Schools that she had knowingly breached; specifically, she
had kept her long-term homosexual relationship a secret because she
70. Dias, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12417, at *12–*13.
71. Id. at *13.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *14.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Dias, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12417, at *16.
77. Id. at *17.
78. Id. at *19.
79. Id. at *18.
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knew “Defendants would view her relationship as a violation of the
morals clause.” 80 Regardless, this fact did not in any way “absolve[ ]
Defendants’ [sic] of any responsibility to conform to the requirements
of law against pregnancy discrimination.” 81
With both parties’ motions for summary judgment denied, the
case moved to a jury trial.82 After hearing extensive arguments on
both sides, as well as testimony from Dias and several members of the
Archdiocese ministry, a federal jury held for Dias under a theory of
pregnancy discrimination and awarded her $170,000 in damages.83
The case drew nation-wide media attention, with commentators de-
scribing it as a “barometer on the degree to which religious organiza-
tions can regulate employees’ lives.” 84
Speaking out after the verdict was returned, Dias’s attorney
claimed that the case “shows jurors are willing to apply the law ‘even
to churches and religious organizations when non-ministerial employ-
ees are discriminated against.’ ” 85 Almost immediately, experts pre-
dicted that the Archdiocese would appeal, potentially raising several
issues, including “how to define a ministerial employee and how to
resolve the conflict between religious employers’ rights versus the
rights of women seeking to reproduce.” 86
II. RE-EXAMINING THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
POST-HOSANNA-TABOR
A. Tracing the Roots of the Ministerial Exception to Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes the following
parameters for employment:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
80. Id. at *17.
81. Id. at *18.
82. Cornwell, Jury, supra note 12.
83. Lisa Cornwell, Christa Dias, Ohio Mom, Awarded More than $170,000 for Discrimi-
nation, Cincinnati Catholic Diocese Expected to Appeal, HUFFINGTON POST  (June 4, 2013,
9:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/christa-dias-mom-awarded-_n_3383
022.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6NJZ-Q6DM [hereinafter Cornwell, Christa].
84. Id.
85. Cornwell, Jury, supra note 12.
86. Id.
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employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.87
Recognizing the inherent tension between Title VII and guar-
anteed religious liberties under the First Amendment, courts strug-
gled after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with how to
preserve “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an inde-
pendence from secular control or manipulation . . . power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church govern-
ment as well as those of faith and doctrine,” 88 while simultaneously
enforcing the legislation’s requirements. The first court to articulate
a way to reconcile these competing principles was the Fifth Circuit,
which created the ministerial exception to Title VII in the 1972 case,
McClure v. Salvation Army.89 The ministerial exception, a mechanism
“rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom . . .
precludes courts from adjudicating certain employment discrimina-
tion claims.” 90
In McClure, the Court focused on Section 702 of Title VII, which,
as originally written, provided that the title “shall not apply to an
employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State
or to a religious corporation, association, or society.”91 Later amended
by Substitute Senate Amendment No. 656 (which then became law),
the general exemption of religious organizations is now limited to
“those practices relating to the employment of individuals of a par-
ticular religion to perform work connected with the employer’s reli-
gious activities . . . .” 92
The court in McClure wrote with deference to a clear precedent
that the First Amendment has built a “wall of separation” between
church and State.93 Emphasizing that the “relationship between an or-
ganized church and its ministers is its lifeblood,” the court highlighted
that “[t]he minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose” and “[m]atters touching this relationship
must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.” 94
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1991).
88. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); see, e.g., Presbyterian Ch.
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Ch., 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969); Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 709–11 (1871).
89. 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972).
90. Blair A. Crunk, New Wine in an Old Chalice: The Ministerial Exception’s Humble
Roots, 73 LA. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2013).
91. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 558–59.
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Accordingly, the court emphasized that it restricted its holding only
to the “church-minister relationship” and expressly refrained from
“any decision as to other church employees of a type not involved in
this controversy.” 95
B. Hosanna-Tabor Further Confuses Application of the
Ministerial Exception
Following McClure, the ministerial exception operated to “exempt
from the coverage of various employment laws the employment rela-
tionships between religious institutions and their ‘ministers.’ ” 96 How-
ever, the standard that the Fifth Circuit articulated in McClure—that
the exception be limited to a religious institution’s relationship with
one of its “ministers”—begs the question of how a minister is defined
in this context. A strict reading of the Title VII language that only
“those practices relating to the employment of individuals of a par-
ticular religion to perform work connected with the employer’s re-
ligious activities” 97 produces a very different expectation than an
interpretation which applies the exception to all employees of a reli-
gious organization. Further, neither a strict nor broad reading of the
ministerial exception to Title VII under McClure implicated the
middle ground, a scenario in which someone who is employed by a
religious organization but is not necessarily connected with the em-
ployer’s religious activities—or at least not to a significant extent—
violates that group’s religious doctrine.
Hosanna-Tabor presented the Supreme Court with an opportu-
nity to address this question, and clearly define which religious insti-
tutions are protected by the ministerial exception and who qualifies
as a “minister” of a religious organization.98 Instead, Hosanna-Tabor
further confused the issue. There, respondent Cheryl Perich worked
at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, the
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, in Redford, Michigan.99 Hosanna-
Tabor School offers a “Christ-centered education” to students in grades
kindergarten through eight, and classifies teachers into two catego-
ries: “called” and “lay.”100 “Called” teachers are seen as having been
called to their position by God; “[t]o be eligible to receive a call from
95. Id. at 555.
96. E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000).
97. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
98. Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
493, 501–03 (2012).
99. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694,
699 (2012).
100. Id.
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a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain academic require-
ments,”101 such as completing a “colloquy” program at a Lutheran col-
lege or university.102 The program requires students to “take eight
courses of theological study, obtain the endorsement of their local
Synod district, and pass an oral examination by a faculty committee;”103
only then may a teacher be called by a congregation.104 A teacher
who subsequently receives a call assumes the formal title “Minister
of Religion, Commissioned,” and serves for an open-ended term.105
“[A]t Hosanna-Tabor, a call could be rescinded only for cause and by
a supermajority vote of the congregation.”106 In comparison, “lay” or
“contract” teachers at the school were not required to undergo any
formal theology training, were appointed by the school board and were
hired only when “called” teachers were unavailable.107 Both lay and
called teachers, however, “generally performed the same duties.”108
Perich served as a “called” teacher from 1999 to 2004; in addition
to teaching math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and
music, her duties included teaching a religion class four days a week
and leading the school in chapel services twice a year.109 In 2004,
Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy and subsequently “began the
2004–05 school year on disability leave.”110 After notifying Hosanna-
Tabor in January 2005 that she would be able to return for the re-
mainder of the school year, the school informed her that her position
had been filled for that time.111 Administrators then held a subsequent
meeting in which they determined that Perich was unlikely to be phys-
ically capable of returning to work in the 2005 school year or the next,
and voted to “offer Perich a ‘peaceful release’ from her call, whereby
the congregation would pay a portion of her health insurance premi-
ums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher.”112
Perich returned to work on February 22, 2005, the day she had
been medically cleared to resume working.113 When she arrived at
Hosanna-Tabor, Principal Stacey Hoeft asked her to leave.114 Later the
same day, Hoeft called Perich at home and told her she would likely
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 699–700.
108. Id. at 700.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694, 700.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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be fired from her position; “Perich responded that she had spoken with
an attorney and intended to assert her legal rights.”115 “Following
a school board meeting” that was held “that same evening, board
chairman Scott Salo sent Perich a letter” explaining that the school
was “reviewing the process for rescinding her call in light of her ‘regretta-
ble’ actions.”116 Salo then followed up with a subsequent letter, ex-
plaining that the congregation would consider whether to rescind
her call during its next meeting.117 The letter cited “insubordination
and disruptive behavior,” as well as damage done to her “working rela-
tionship” with Hosanna-Tabor and her “threatening to take legal
action” as grounds for termination.118 Following the congregation’s
vote to rescind Perich’s call and her subsequent termination, Perich
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, which brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.119
The District Court granted summary judgment for Hosanna-
Tabor, agreeing that Perich’s claims were barred by the ministerial
exception.120 On appeal in the Sixth Circuit, the court “vacated and
remanded the decision, concluding ‘Perich did not qualify as a “min-
ister” under the exception [and] noting in particular that her duties
as a called teacher were identical to her duties as a lay teacher.’ ”121
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment
bar [an employment discrimination] action when the employer is a
religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.”122
The Supreme Court then unanimously overturned the holding of
the Sixth Circuit, with Chief Justice Roberts writing the opinion in the
Court’s first occasion to consider whether the “freedom of a religious
organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging
discrimination in employment.”123 Recognizing the existence of the
ministerial exception, Justice Roberts wrote, “[b]y imposing an un-
wanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments.”124 Further, “[a]ccording the state the
power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 700–01.
120. Id. at 701.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 699.
123. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705.
124. Id. at 706.
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violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government in-
volvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”125
It is this second aspect of the holding that begs the question of
who exactly can qualify as a minister.126 Justice Roberts acknowledged
that “[e]very Court of Appeals to have considered the question has
concluded that the ministerial exception is not limited to the head
of a religious congregation,”127 and the Supreme Court agreed. How-
ever, Justice Roberts articulated that the Court was “reluctant . . .
to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as
a minister”; instead, it was “enough for [the Court] to conclude, in [the
first Supreme Court] case involving the ministerial exception, that
the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employ-
ment.”128 Specifically, the Court pointed to the fact that “Hosanna-
Tabor held Perich out as a minister, with a role distinct from that
of most of its members,”129 she was tasked with performing her role
in accordance with specific religious doctrine, her “skills of ministry”
were a factor in her performance reviews,130 and “Perich’s title as a
minister reflected a significant degree of religious training followed
by a formal process of commissioning.”131 Furthermore, Perich “held
herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to
religious service, according to its terms,”132 and her job duties “re-
flected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out
its mission.”133
Lastly, the Court rejected the EEOC’s contention that “any min-
isterial exception ‘should be limited to those employees who perform
exclusively religious functions.’ ”134 The Court further narrowed this
holding, noting the amount of time Perich spent performing religious
functions is irrelevant; this is an issue that cannot be “resolved by a
stopwatch.”135 While the Court acknowledged the harms that the
EEOC hypothesized could flow from applying the ministerial exception
to this case,136 Justice Roberts rejected the arguments, given that the
125. Id.
126. Murray, supra note 98, at 499.
127. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 707.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 709.
136. Id. at 710. The EEOC argued a “parade of horribles” would flow from recognizing
the ministerial exception in employment discrimination suits, such as protecting “religious
organizations from liability for retaliating against employees for reporting criminal mis-
conduct or for testifying before a grand jury or in a criminal trial.” Id. Further, the EEOC
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case is “an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a
minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her.”137 Chief
Justice Roberts emphasized that the ministerial exception only bars
“such a suit,” and noted that the Court expresses “no view on
whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their
religious employers.”138
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas stated that “[a] religious
organization’s right to choose its ministers would be hollow . . . if
secular courts could second-guess . . . the organization’s theological
tenants.”139 Any “[j]udicial attempts to fashion a civil definition of
‘minister’ through a bright-line test or multi-factor analysis risk disad-
vantaging those religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and member-
ship are outside of the ‘mainstream’ or unpalatable to some,” he said.140
Here Justice Thomas takes perhaps the most deferential approach to
the issue, asserting, “[T]he Religion Clauses require civil courts to
apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious organiza-
tion’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”141
Similarly, in a separate concurrence, Justice Alito, joined by
Justice Kagan, wrote that the term “minister” and the “concept of
ordination” should not be viewed as central to the issue of religious
autonomy.142 Courts should instead “focus on the function performed
by persons who work for religious bodies.”143 The ministerial exception
should be tailored to the purpose of the First Amendment, Justice
Alito wrote, which “protects the freedom of religious groups to engage
in certain key religious activities, including the conducting of worship
services and other religious ceremonies and rituals,” in addition to
“the critical process of communicating the faith.”144 In accordance with
this fundamental right, “religious groups must be free to choose the
personnel who are essential to the performance of these functions.”145
Indeed, it is a religious group’s constitutional right to remove an em-
ployee from his or her position if the group believes that the em-
ployee’s ability to perform the position has been compromised.146
contended that the logic behind the exception would “confer on religious employers ‘unfet-
tered discretion’ to violate employment laws by, for example, hiring children or aliens not
authorized to work in the United States.” Id.
137. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
138. Id.
139. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 711.
141. Id. at 710.
142. Id. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring).
143. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 711–12.
145. Id. at 712.
146. Id.
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III. HOSANNA-TABOR COURT DEFERS TO RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS TO DEFINE ITS “MINISTERS”
Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati presented one of the first oppor-
tunities post-Hosanna-Tabor for a court to evaluate whether the
ministerial exception applies in an employment discrimination case.147
To determine whether Dias, a technology coordinator with no reli-
gious training, qualified as a minister of the Archdiocese, the Court
closely examined her job functions within the school, distinguishing
her responsibilities from Perich’s in Hosanna-Tabor.148
Defendants here did not hold Plaintiff out as a minister, they did
not give her any sort of religious title or commission, and the con-
gregations of the Defendant churches took no role in reviewing
her “skills in ministry” or her “ministerial responsibilities” because
she had none. Plaintiff argues Defendants never charged her with
teaching the faith, participating in religious services, or leading de-
votional exercises, and she never held herself out as a minister,
nor did she ever undergo religious training. In fact, as a non-
Catholic, Defendants would not permit her to teach basic Catho-
lic doctrine.149
[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiff is correct that her duties while
employed by Defendants show that she was not a minister for pur-
poses of the ministerial exception. Clearly, Plaintiff performed
duties as a computer teacher and overseeing computer systems.
The Court finds dispositive that as a non-Catholic, Plaintiff was
not even permitted to teach Catholic doctrine. Plaintiff had re-
ceived no religious training or title and had no religious duties.
The authorities cited by Plaintiff show that it is not enough to
generally call her a ‘role model,’ or find that she is a ‘minister’ by
virtue of her affiliation with a religious school. As such, Plaintiff’s
claims are not barred by the ministerial exception.150
Reaching this determination required precisely the kind of judicial
second-guessing that Justice Thomas likely anticipated in his
Hosanna-Tabor concurrence.151
147. Jessica L. Waters, Testing Hosanna-Tabor: The Implications for Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Claims and Employees’ Reproductive Rights, 9 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 47, 68–69 (2013).
148. Id.
149. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43240, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012).
150. Id. at *17.
151. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring),
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Circuit courts have generally agreed that the definition of a
“minister” depends on an individual’s job functions within a religious
organization.152 Not surprisingly, a separate debate has emerged re-
garding what qualifies as a religious organization,153 but for the pur-
poses of this Note, who qualifies as a minister is the determinative
question once a court finds an organization to be of religious affilia-
tion. Separately, the EEOC has its own standard for evaluating
whether the ministerial exception applies in a Title VII discrimination
case, though the organization’s guidelines are not clear. The EEOC
states that the ministerial exception “applies only to employees who
perform essentially religious functions, namely those whose primary
duties consist of engaging in church governance, supervising a reli-
gious order, or conducting religious ritual, worship, or instruction.”154
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, Courts also differed in terms of the pro-
cedural application of the ministerial exception, specifically whether
it should function as an affirmative defense on the merits or a juris-
dictional bar.155 As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-
Tabor articulated that the exception operates as an affirmative
defense “to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar,”
because “the issue presented by the exception is whether the allega-
tions the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief, not whether the court
has power to hear [the] case.”156 Justice Roberts concluded that
“District courts have power to consider ADA claims in cases of this
sort, and to decide whether the claim can proceed or is instead barred
152. See, e.g., Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40533, at *8
(9th Cir.) (“In this circuit, a person qualifies as a minister under this exception if she: (1)
is employed by a religious institution; (2) was chosen for the position based largely on
religious criteria, and (3) performs some religious duties and responsibilities.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (in general, an employee will be considered
a minister if her job responsibilities include “teaching, spreading the faith, church gover-
nance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation  in religious ritual
and worship”); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 394 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (agreeing
that “a focus on the function of an employee’s position is the proper one”).
153. Murray, supra note 98, at 511.
154. EEOC, Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace (Jan.
31, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/V5A9-Q7RZ.
155. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (comparing Hollins v. Methodist Health-
care, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007), and Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442
F.3d 1036, 1038–39 (7th Cir. 2006) (treating the exception as jurisdictional), with Petruska,
462 F. 3d at 302, Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002), Bollard
v. Cal. Province of Soc. of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999) and Natal v. Christian
& Military Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (all treating the exception as an affirmative
defense)).
156. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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by the ministerial exception,”157 thus giving the courts the power to
determine whether an employment discrimination claim, such as
one filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Title VII, is
bona fide or an exception to the rule.
IV. WHO SHOULD QUALIFY AS A MINISTER? A PROPOSED
UNIFORM TEST FOR FUTURE APPLICATION
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized that a religious
organization’s freedom to select its ministers must be weighed in an
employment discrimination context, perhaps the best test to apply in
determining who qualifies as a minister in an employment discrimi-
nation context is something similar to the Ninth Circuit’s. Like others,
the Ninth Circuit recognizes that “[b]ecause the plain language of
Title VII purports to reach a church’s employment decisions regard-
ing its ministers,”158 the ministerial exception plays a critical role in
reconciling the statute with the Constitution. In Bollard v. California
Province of the Society of Jesus, the court explained that Title VII
creates “two exemptions from its non-discrimination mandate for re-
ligious groups. One permits a religious entity to restrict employment
connected with the carrying on . . . of its activities to members of its
own faith; the other permits parochial schools to do the same.”159
However, the scope of the exception’s application must be limited to
“what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment;”160 for ex-
ample, “[i]n the case of lay employees, the particularly strong reli-
gious interests surrounding a church’s choice of its representatives
are missing,”161 and therefore the Ninth Circuit has concluded that
applying Title VII is constitutionally permissible. The Circuit seems
to view the potential for a secular court to pass judgment on questions
of faith or doctrine as the tipping point in a Title VII case where the
ministerial exception may apply.162
So, if an employee’s job functions are inextricably linked to per-
forming religious functions—regardless of the extent of his or her
additional, non-religious responsibilities—a church-minister rela-
tionship implicitly exists.163 Additionally, if the nature of that rela-
tionship, or the duties imposed upon that minister, is outlined in his
or her employment contract, a court’s role in evaluating a contract
157. Id.
158. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946–47 (1999).
159. Id. at 945 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
160. Id. at 947.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 948–49.
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dispute between the parties should end there, absent any showing
of race, sex or national origin discrimination. As the Ninth Circuit
has articulated, “neither of [Title VII’s] exceptions remove race, sex,
or national origin as an impermissible basis of discrimination against
employees of religious institutions. Nor do they single out ministe-
rial employees for lesser protections than those enjoyed by other
church employees.”164
CONCLUSION
Though the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor recognized for
the first time the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense in
employment discrimination cases, by limiting its decision to one cause
of action, the Court opened the door to much uncertainty in future
application.165 Indeed, it is precisely this type of uncertainty that arose
in Dias, where a religious organization viewed one of its ministers
as having violated a morals clause in her employment contract.166
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have consistently upheld the sort of morals
clause that was at issue in Dias, so long as they are applied equally
to male and female employees.167 However, this did not persuade the
District Court in Dias; in evaluating whether the case should be re-
solved in summary judgment, the Court noted that this type of pro-
vision is a “close call” because “Plaintiff performed her duties under
the contract, and the only basis for her termination was Defendant’s
interpretation of the morals clause.”168 Ultimately, the Court held
164. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945.
165. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
710 (2012) (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf
of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the
ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars
other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious
conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability
of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”).
166. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240,
at *17–*20 (S.D. Ohio 2012). Dias’s contract explicitly stated that she would “comply with
and act consistently in accordance with the stated philosophy and teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church[.]” Id. Though in the church’s eyes Dias’s use of artificial insemination
was “gravely immoral” under a Catechism of the Catholic Church, Dias contended that
the contract made no specific reference to artificial insemination and that the school’s
contention that “she engaged in bad faith by signing such contracts is contingent upon
proof that she knew that such conduct was against the teachings and philosophy of the
church[.]” Id.
167. See id. at *18 (citing Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658–59
(6th Cir. 2000) (“morals clause applied equally to male and female employees provides
no basis for pregnancy discrimination”); Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, 88 F.3d 410,
413 (6th Cir. 1996) (“morals clause upheld prohibiting employees from engaging in pre-
marital sex”)).
168. Id. at *19–*20.
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that contract law dictates that “[a]n enforceable contract requires a
meeting of the minds,” and here defendants attempted to “use against
Plaintiff a broad contract provision that does not specifically pro-
hibit artificial insemination.”169
This type of uncertainty is precisely what should have been ad-
dressed in Hosanna-Tabor. There, the Court passed on a valuable
opportunity to devise a standard for evaluating who qualifies as a
minister. Further, the Court should have taken the opportunity to
extrapolate on how the ministerial exception should function in other
contexts, such as contract disputes (a key element in Dias, for exam-
ple) and tort claims. “Such issues can be judged when they arise,”
the Court concluded.170
However, the Court did not explain its rationale for this narrow
holding. If the ministerial exception creates an affirmative defense
for religious organizations that terminate the employment of its min-
isters, why should a contract dispute between these same parties be
treated differently? When an individual takes on a role as a minister
of a religious organization, it is inconceivable that job functions and
responsibilities will not be outlined in an employment contract.
Therefore, if a religious organization deems that one of its ministers
has violated a provision in his or her employment contract that
specifically pertains to a religious function, any ensuing contract dis-
pute must necessarily be guided by the same principle underlying
the exception itself. As the Court held in Hosanna-Tabor, the “pur-
pose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire
a minister only when it is made for a religious reason;” instead, it “en-
sures that the authority to select and control who will minister to
the faithful—[is] a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical.’ ”171
Courts have frequently recognized that “ ‘a church is always free
to burden its activities voluntarily through contract, and such con-
tracts are fully enforceable in civil court.’ ”172 Under the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment, “[e]nforcement of a promise,
willingly made and supported by consideration, in no way consti-
tutes a state-imposed limit upon a church’s free exercise rights.”173
However, under the Establishment Clause, the issue is complicated by
169. Id. at *19.
170. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: A Solid “Ministerial Exception,” SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 11, 2012 11:33 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/opinion-recap-a-solid-minis
terial-exception/, archived at http://perma.cc/492D-DWXC.
171. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94, 119 (1952).
172. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006), (quoting Minker v.
Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir.
1990)).
173. Id. at 310.
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a contract that entangles competing religious and statutory rights.174
Accordingly, “courts typically consider the character of the claim, the
nature of the remedy, and the presence or absence of a direct con-
flict between the . . . secular prohibition and the proffered religious
doctrine.”175 If resolution of a contract dispute therefore turns on an
ecclesiastical inquiry, it may be unconstitutional for a court to decide
who should prevail. A contractual claim such as the one at issue in
Dias highlights exactly this type of problem. Though the Church
viewed Dias’s use of artificial insemination as strictly prohibited by
Catholic Catechism, the District Court rejected summary judgment
on the contract claim, holding that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to the interpretation of the morals clause at hand.
Aside from the fact that this type of holding creates precisely
the judicial second guessing that Justice Thomas cautioned courts
against employing, allowing a court to determine the breadth and
meaning of a morals clause may require religious organizations to
draft employment contracts with a high level of specificity as to each
separate provision. It is easy to see how including this level of detail
may be virtually impossible in an employment contract setting, leav-
ing the door open to an employee—despite whether that individual
is a minister of the church—to allege breach of contract based on his
or her interpretation of the agreement. Furthermore, employees of
a religious organization may have a strong argument that this type
of employment agreement is unconscionable and therefore unen-
forceable, regardless of whether the employee signed the contract at
the start of his or her employment.
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Hosanna-Tabor, the minis-
terial exception is critically important to preserving religious free-
dom as a right constitutionally granted by the First Amendment.176
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld First Amendment
principles, recognizing that hierarchical religious organizations
have a constitutional right to “establish their own rules and regula-
tions for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals
for adjudicating disputes over these matters.”177 Furthermore, “the
Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as bind-
ing upon them.”178 This constitutionally guaranteed religious free-
dom might be threatened, however, by judicial second-guessing of
employment decisions by religious employers. Without more clarity
174. Id. at 311.
175. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
176. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct at 712.
177. Id. at 705 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952).
178. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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from the Supreme Court on who qualifies as a minister and in which
contexts the exception should apply, religious employers may even-
tually draft contracts so stringent they border on unconscionable.
On the other end of the spectrum is the more alarming possibility that
religious organizations may have to defend all of its employment deci-
sions, thereby dissolving the ministerial exception and tarnishing its
First Amendment roots.
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